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LABOR LAW - BACK p AY - REQUIREMENT OF DEDUCTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF GovERNMENTAL RELIEF AGENCIES - Having found that the
petitioner, by discharging employees for union activities, had engaged in an
unfair labor practice, the National Labor Relations Board ordered the employees' reinstatement with back pay, less monies received during the period
of discharge for work performed upon federal, state, county, municipal or other
work-relief projects, and the payment of this amount received to the appropriate
fiscal agencies of the government or governments which. supplied the funds for
the work-relief projects. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
directed enforcement of the board's order. On petition for a writ of certiorari
to that court, held that the board's order should be enforced with the reimbursement ·provisions eliminated. Justices Black and Douglas dissented. Republic
Steel Corporation v. NationCfl Labor Relations Board, (U. S. r940) 9 U. S.
LAW WEEK 4or9, modifying {C. C. A. 3d, r939) ro7 F. {2d) 472.
Originally the National Labor Relations Board refused to deduct, from back
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pay awards, payments received on relief, on the theory that such payments were
not a part of net earnings and only net earnings could be deducted. 1 While still
not considering work-relief as part of the employee's net earnings, the board
in more recent cases has ordered reinstatement with wages that would have
been earned, less net earnings during the period; deducting, however, from the
amount otherwise due, monies received for work performed on work-relief.
Such monies were ordered paid to the appropriate relief agencies which supplied
the work-relief funds. 2 The board asserts the right to order reimbursement under
section Io ( c) of the National Labor Relations Act, which gives the board
power "to take such affirmative action ••• as will effectuate the policies of this
Act." 3 Broadly, the question is, "Does the order requiring reimbursement
effectuate the policy of the act?" 4 From the decisions of the courts, one can
assume that an affirmative order will be upheld as carrying the legislative policy
1 No home relief money was deducted in Matter of Vegetable Oil Products Co.,
Inc., 1 N. L. R. B. 989 (1936) and as modified in 5 N. L. R. B. 52 (1938). The
deduction of wages from a W. P. A. project in Matter of Associated Press, 1 N. L. R. B.
788 (1936), can best be explained on the ground that a $200 a month job is a good
deal more than mere relief. See In the Matter of Burk Bros., 21 N. L. R. B., No. 126
( I 940), for a list of sources of money which make the payments exempt from deduction. 48 YALE L. J. 1265 (1939) has a good discussion of the whole problem of back
pay orders. The order for reinstatement with back pay, less amount earned, was made
in the board's first case, In the Matter of Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, I N. L. R. B.
I (1935).
2
The first such order was issued in Matter of Republic Steel Corp., 9 N. L. R. B.
219 (1938). The language used by the board in this case is typical: "make whole [the
employees] for any losses of pay they have suffered by reason of the respondent's discriminatory acts, by payment to each ..• of a sum of money equal to that which each
of them would normally have earned as wages during the period ... less the amounts,
if any, which each earned during said period, deducting, however, from the amount
otherwise due to each of the said employees, monies received by said employees during
said periods for work performed upon Federal, State, county, municipal, or other
work-relief projects; and pay over the amounts, so deducted, to the appropriate fiscal
agency of the Federal, State, county, municipal, or other government or governments
which supplied the funds for said work-relief projects...." Id., 9 N. L. R. B. 219 at
402. In all the board's orders, the phrase used to describe money due the governments
is, "deducting from the amount otherwise due." The increasing popularity of the
order can be illustrated by its use only once from 1936 through November, 1938, while
it was given 25 times during February and March, 1939.
3
49 Stat. L. 454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 160 (c).
4
ln Matter of Republic Steel Corp., 9 N. L. R. B. 219 (1938) the board used
the negative approach that since the policy of the act would not be effectuated by having
the government take the burden of supporting the employees, the employer should take
that burden. Some affirmative acts which have been ordered are: to hire discharged employee at the expense of the man hired in his place, National Labor Relations Board
v. Carlisle Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 94 F. (2d) 138; to withdraw recognition of the company union and post notices, National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571 (1938); to place employee
on preferred list, In the Matter of Cummins Engine Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 642 (1938);
to notify the board of compliance with orders, In the Matter of Hewitt Soap Co.,
Inc., 6 N. L. R. B. 715 (1938); to bargain collectively on request of the union, In the
Matter of Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 7 N. L. R. B. 186 (1938); to repay
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into effect (I) if it secures to the employees rights guaranteed them by the act, 6
(2) if it is remedial and not punitive,6 and (3) if it is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.7 Failure to satisfy one or more of these requirements has
caused four circuit courts of appeals to refuse to enforce reimbursement orders. 8
Two other circuits, emphasizing the criterion of reasonableness, have enforced
the board's orders.9 As to the first requisite, it would appear that the order in the
employees money deducted from pay to go as dues to company union, In the Matter
of Lone Star Bag and Bagging Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 244 (1938); to hire at substantially
the same position, In the Matter of Republic Steel Corp_., 9 N. L. R. B. 219 (1938);
and to sign a written contract, Art Metals Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, (C .C. A. 2d, 1940) I IO F. (2d) 148. An order of the type last mentioned was
refused in Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940)
109 F. (2d) 9.
5
"On the contrary, the purpose of the Act is to promote peaceful settlements of
disputes by providing legal remedies for the invasion of the employees' rights. • . .
The affirmative action that is authorized is to make these remedies effective in the
redress of the employees' rights, to assure them self-organization and freedom in
representation. . . ." National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U. S. 240 at 258, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571 (1938).
6
"We think that this authority to order affirmative action does not go so far as
to confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon the employer any
penalty it may choose because he is engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the
Board be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such an
order." Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 at
235-236, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1938); National Labor Relations Board
v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 509. The author of the
comment in 28 CAL. L. REv. 402 (1940) considers the back pay provisions penalties
themselves.
7
National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1937)
91 F. (2d) 509; and National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U.S. 240 at 258, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1938): "What we have said also meets the
point that the question whether reinstatement or reemployment would effectuate the
policies of the Act is committed to the decision of the Board in the exercise of its
discretion subject only to the limitation that its action may not be 'arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.' "
8
National Labor Relations Board v. Tovrea Packing Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1940)
I II F. (2d) 626 at 630: "To our minds the discretion conferred upon the Board is
limited to the point of whether an order for back pay will do more toward effectuating
the P.urposes of the Act than to omit it-or possibly than an order for payment of part
thereof. Whether or not this provision is held to be punitive in nature, we see no warrant for doing other than it provides. Certainly it does not authorize the Board to go
outside of the statute and prescribe its own coercive measures in aid of 'effectuating' the
purposes of the Act." The court in both National Labor Relations Board v. Waumbec
Mills._, Inc., (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 226, and National Labor Relations Board
v. Leviton Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) III F. (2d) 619, has considered the order
punitive. Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) 6 L. R. R. 691, adds unreasonableness to the other counts against the order.
9
National Labor Relations Board v. Planters Mfg. Co., Inc., (C. C. A. 4th, 1939)
105 F. (2d) 750, enforced an order with no discussion of the particular point. In the
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principal case does not aid the securing of an invaded right. The board itself
has admitted that the employee has no just claim against the employer for
duplication of money received from.work-relief. 10 Actually, the employee's right
to engage in union activities and still retain his job has been protected by the
order of reinstatement with money equal to what he would have earned if there
had been no unwarranted discharge, less net earnings, including relief wages,
during the period of discharge. It is difficult to assume that Congress intended
the reimbursement of relief agencies to be one of the policies of the act which
the board could effectuate by affirma!ive orders, when such reimbursement is
of no direct aid to the employees in their efforts to achieve collective action.
Secondly, since it appears that the order neither redresses a grievance nor hinders a possible invasion of rights, it would follow that the order is not remedial.
If not remedial, an order to pay money would appear to be punitive. The
Supreme Court has previously ruled that an affirmative order under section
10( c) canno_t inflict a penalty on the employer,11 Thirdly, even if an order
secures a right for the employee, and is not punitive, it still cannot be unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary. As to this test, there is ample room for argument.
The board, bolstered by two circuit courts of appeals, finds such an order reasonable on the theory that an employer should not force the whole community to
assume the burden of supporting an employee who has been unlawfully discharged.12 Other circuit courts conclude that such an order is unreasonable since
the government's work-relief projects are founded on the idea that the recipient
of work-relief gives work equal to the remuneration.13 Furthermore, even if an
agency asked for the money, which none has, it is doubtful if it would have
authority to accept it. Judge Major of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has suggested that it is extremely unreasonable to ask an employer to determine how much each of several possible agencies contributed to
the employee's relief checks.14 Granting that the order for reimbursement is
reasonable on the grounds of policy as urged by the board, the Court in the present case wisely refused to enforce an affirmative order which secured no right
to the employee and which was plainly punitive on its face.

Rex B. Martin
lower court decision of the principal case, 107 F. (2d) 472, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit thought the order reasonable.
10 The very fact that the board continued to make such orders would indicate
that they did not believe the employee should have his relief monies duplicated. See
the lower court decision in the principal case, 107 F. (2d) 472.
11 Th~ United States Supreme Court has been quite definite in its assertion that the
power is remedial and not punitive. See note 6, supra. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938); National
Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 59 S. Ct. 490
(1938). National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., (C. C. A. 2d,
1938) 94 F. (2d) 862, held that the power was remedial and designed to enable the
board to restore the status quo as nearly as possible as of the time before the wrong was
done-and further the board could not go.
12
See cases cited note 9, supra.
18 Judge Major's decision in Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 6 L. R. R. 691, is the best exposition of the argument.
14
Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) 6 L. R.R. 691.

